INTRODUCTION
generated much attention about the likelihood principle (LP) and the likelihood function for parametric inference, in non-Bayesian parametric models, by showing that LP is a consequence of principles of sufficiency (SP) and conditionality (CP). As several authors have noted (e.g., Bayarri, de Groot, and Kadane 1987, Berger and Wolpert 1988 [hereafter denoted BW] , and Butler 1987) , the case considered by Birnbaum is rather restrictive. For example, it does not cover any type of prediction problem or modeling approaches in survey sampling. When the problem does not perfectly fit the usual parametric case, the definition of the likelihood function is not clear and hence the LP is in doubt.
The main purpose of this article is to extend the concept of likelihood and the LP beyond the case of parametric inference in parametric models to inferential aims and models of a rather general nature that may include fixed parameters, "random" parameters, and unobserved variables. Included as special cases are parametric and/or predictive inference in general parametric, Bayes, and empirical Bayes models, as well as missing-data problems like nonresponse in sampling. The definition of likelihood and LP, SP, and CP are uniquely modified for the general situation, in such a way that we are able to prove the equivalence SP and CP H LP,
thereby achieving the same justification for LP in general as in regular parametric inference and at the same time clarifying what the definition of the likelihood function should be. This article shows that the concept of likelihood is of universal value. The definition of the generalized likelihood, together with (I), shows what the basis for the analysis of data should be under the usual framework for statistical experiments. One general consequence for practically all kinds of statistical problems and models is that the usual unconditional frequentist evaluation of statistical methods is not sufficient and can be only a secondary consideration.
This work started with the aim of modifying LP, SP, and CP and generalizing Birnbaum's fundamental result (1) to prediction and missing-data problems in non-Bayesian parametric models. The likelihood function on which LP is based then forms the foundation on which to base a discussion of prediction methods, in particular methods based on the concept of predictive likelihood reviewed by Bjeirnstad (1990) . Currently, this concept seems to lack a theoretical basis.
After considering the prediction case, little effort is needed to cover likelihood and LP in more generality. Statisticians have disagreed on the general definition of likelihood. An extensive discussion can be found in BW. This issue has also been considered by Royal1 (1976) , Butler (1987) , Bayarri et al. (1987) , and Bayarri and DeGroot (1988) .
Section 2 describes the general statistical problem, with various special cases prdvided as illustrations. In general, Y = y denotes the data and $ denotes the unobservable variables, which may consist of variables to be predicted and/or parameters in a Bayes or empirical Bayes model. The unknown fixed parameters characterizing the distribution of (Y, $) are denoted by 0. In general fs(.) ( fe(.1. ) ) denotes the probability density function (conditional pdf) of the enclosed variables. Here, the pdf represents the probability function in discrete experiments and the density in the continuous cases. The complete specified model is then and the experiment is formalized as the triple E = {Y, (+, 01, P}.
The quantity of interest for statistical analysis is some function of + and possibly y, X = A , = A(+, y), and maybe 8 or some part of 0. Typically, X = A(+), independent of y, but as seen in Section 2, in missing-data problems the quantity X of interest cannot be determined until y is observed. In the continuous case, the mapping A(., .) is assumed to be such that the density of Y, X exists. Using a similar notation as BW, we denote by I x ( E ,y) the inference about X (and 0 when relevant) when y is an observation from experiment 1. the specification of the complete model for observable variables, unobservable variables of interest (both in a modeling sense and for inferential purpose) and unknown parameters 2, the objective or inferential aim of the statistical investigation.
Section 4.1 discusses the choice of likelihood function, and Section 4.2 defines and discusses LP. The main result, that LP is implied by (and implies) SP and CP, is proved. The general LP for the, case when A does not depend on y is defined as follows:
The likelihood principle. Consider two experiments with identical unknown quantities ($,8 ) and likelihood functions I$:) ( A ,8 ) and l g ) ( A ,8 ) . Assume that I$:) ( A ,0 ) = c l g ) ( A ,8 ) 
;c independent of ( A ,8 ) . Then I A( E l ,y l ) = I A(E2,~2 ) .
Section 5 studies likelihood in the case of nuisance parameters, including the case of prediction. The fixed parameters are now represented as ( 0 ,w ) , where w denotes the nuisance parameters. Section 5.1 considers the case where the likelihood factorizes 1 ( A ,8 ,w ) = l1 ( A ,8)L2( w ) . Partial likelihood, based on 11, and partial sufficiency principles for ( A ,8 ) are defined, and the main result in Section 4 is generalized to this case. Section 5.2 considers the same factorization for prediction of A, when all fixed parameters are regarded as nuisance parameters. Section 5.3 discusses predictive likelihoods and prediction methods from the LP perspective.
Section 6 deals with models in survey sampling. The likelihood function and LP are applied to the fundamental issues of ignorability of sampling and response mechanisms.
THE GENERAL STATISTICAL PROBLEM
The aim is to present a valid likelihood principle (in the sense that "generally accepted" SP and CP imply LP) that, in addition to the usual case of parametric inference in a non-Bayesian parametric model discussed by Birnbaum (1962) , can be applied in a variety of models and inference problems with special attention to prediction. Some examples of the type of problems and models that we have in mind, not covered by Birnbaum, are the cases A-D as follows.
Case A: Regular prediction. The aim is to predict the value z of some unobservable or future random variable Z . The complete model P could be any of the following three:
Parametric model. Y,Z fe ( y ,z ) and P = {fe ( y ,z ) , 8 E @). Bayes model. Let w now denote the unknown parameters characterizing the joint distribution of Y ,Z .
Hence, given w , (Y,Z ) -f ( y,zl w ). The prior is f ( w ) ,
and P = f ( y , z , w ) = f ( w )f ( y ,zlw), consisting of one element. Empirical Bayes model. The prior is assumed to belong to a family of distributions, {f e ( w ) ,8 E @).
The quantity of interest is z , and 8 and w play the role of nuisance parameters. In the parametric and empirical Bayes models, we need to define a likelihood function for ( z ,O ) , whereas in the Bayes model it is possible to define a likelihood function for z alone. Case D: Survey sampling with nonresponse, population model. Survey sampling under a population model is a field where the likelihood function has not been defined properly. Consider a finite population of N units where N is known. Let yi be the value of the variable of interest for unit i. A sample s of size n is chosen according to some sampling design. The aim is to make..inference about y = ( y l , .. . ,y~) , usually the total t = C z lyi. We regard y as a realized value of a random vector Y and assume a model for Y . Such modeling of the population is in principle no different from the usual type of modeling that we regularly do in statistical analysis. In virtually all sample surveys, it turns out that some units in s do not respond; that is, we have nonresponse. It is not uncommon to have a nonresponse of at least 30%-40%. To perform a realistic and relevant statistical analysis, it thus is necessary to include with the population model a model of the process that leads to nonresponse. The response pattern is described by the response variables, Ri = 1 if unit i responds and zero otherwise. The response sample is s, = { i E s : ri = 11, and the observed yi values are y , = (yi: i E s & ri = 1 ) . The unobserved part of y is y , = (yi: i @ s,). If we are interested in the total t , then note that t = CiEST yi + z , where z = xi@,, yi. Because CiEs, yi is observed, estimating t can be regarded as the problem of predicting z . We note that y , (or z if we are interested only in t )is a function of the data, through s,, as well as the population vector y . Hence the quantity of interest is a function X of ( y ,s,).
All these cases fit the following scenario: the data are Y = y , and + are the unobservable variables. In some cases it may be convenient to let $ include variables that are useful for modeling. Random-effects models are examples of cases where $ contains random parameters, essential for modeling purposes but not of inferential interest. An illustration is given in Example 2 in Section 3.2 and by BW (ex. 11.1).The unknown fixed parameters characterizing the distribution of (Y,$) 
The parameter 8 may or may not be of inferential interest. In addition, the quantity of interest for statistical analysis is typically some function of $,X = A(+). But as Case D shows, in survey sampling the data determine the variable of interest. Therefore, we shall in general allow X to be a function of both $ and y, A, = A($, y). We denote by I x ( E ,y ) the inference about X (or (A,8) Let us now see how the Cases A-D can be considered as special cases of the general setup. . . ,n) and s, = (il,. . . i,,) ,and let ri = 1 if yi is observed and zero otherwise. Then the data consist of (yi,ri = 1 ) ,i E S , and (ri = 0 ,i E s -s,). Likelihood analysis for 8 alone has been considered by Little and Rubin (1987) . But if the y data set is supposed to be for public use, then it may be necessary to "complete" it by using imputations for the missing values. This means that we are interested in both 8 and X = (yi:i $ s,) = ($i: ri = 0 ) . Hence the quantity X is detqmined by the response vector r = ( r l , . . . ,r,).
3. SUFFICIENCY AND CONDlTlONALlTY PRINCIPLES The concept of sufficiency is derived as a simple modification of prediction sufficiency. Because prediction sufficiency may not be a household concept, a short review is presented.
Prediction Sufficiency
Consider the parametric model: Y,Z -f0 ( y , z ) The problem is to predict the value of Z. An intuitive extension of parametric sufficiency to sufficiency in prediction problems is to consider sufficiency for the two unknowns 8 and z in the family of conditional distributions of Y given z: {fO(yjz))O,zLet t = T ( y )be a function of y.
Definition I . T is predictive sufficient for Z (and 8) if T is sufficient for z and 0 in the conditional family {fs(yIz))e,,;that is, fs(ylt,z) = f ( y l t ) , independent of 0 and z.
Here f ( y It) = f ( y ) /f ( t ) when T ( y )= t . In the continuous case, under wide regularity conditions on the mapping T ,f ( y It) is a density with respect to a 0-finite measure concentrated on T-' ( { t ) )(see Rao 1973, p. 99 , for an elementary description). Evans et al. (1985) considered more restrictive conditions to ensure that the conditional density is of a certain canonical form. Any predictive sufficient statistic is also parametrically sufficient for 8. Also, if Y and Z are independent, then predictive sufficiency is equivalent to usual parametric sufficiency for 8.
Before stating the sufficiency principle for prediction (SPP), let us review this principle for the parametric problem. Here E = { Y , 8, P ) with
that T ( Y ) is sufficient for 8. Let ET denote the experiment of observing t = T ( y ) . Birnbaum (1962) defined ( S B ) as I ( E , y) = I ( E T , T ( y ) ) . Basu (1975) and Dawid (1977) considered the following consequence of ( S B ) , called the weak sufficiency principle (WSB):
Returning to the prediction problem, consider the experiment E = { Y , ( z , 8 ) , P ) . We need only the analog of ( W S B ) .To simplify terminology, and because this is the only version we need, the term "weak" is not used here. Hence we have the following: SPP: Let T ( Y ) be predictive sufficient and assume
fe(ylt, z ) we have the following equivalent version of Definition 1, first observed by Skibinsky (1967) . If T is predictive sufficient, then it follows, from Lemma 1, that T is Bayes sufficient for any prior in the sense that the posterior predictive distribution f (zly) = f (zit) with t = T ( y ) .Hence, marginally, Y and Z are conditionally independent given T. Sufficiency in prediction has been studied by several authors. All of the various definitions in the literature are equivalent to Definition 1. Skibinsky (1967) seems to have been the first by introducing the concept of adequate statistics, defined by Conditions a and b in Lemma 1, modifying the concept of transitive and sufficient sequences in sequential experiments by Bahadur (1954) . The following result for univariate Z , shown by Skibinsky (1967) , says that T is "risk sufficient" for predicting Z with mean squared error (MSE) loss. Lauritzen (1974) considered prediction in stochastic processes and introduced the concept of totally sufficient statistics, which in our model is equivalent to Skibinsky's definition of adequate statistics. Cox and Hinkley (1974, p. 60) seem to have been the first authors to use the term "predictive sufficient" for a statistic satisfying the conditions in Lemma 1.
To illustrate some important aspects of prediction sufficiency, we consider the following illuminating simple example due to Basu (1974) , used in his discussion of Lauritzen (1974) .
Example I (Basu) . The data y are values of iid N ( 8 , 1 ) X 1 , .. . ,X,. Z = X , + U, where Y ,U are independent and U is N ( 0 , l ) . Basu (1974) noted that X is not predictive sufficient, ( X , X,) is predictive sufficient, and both X and X , are "sufficient" -for z in the sense that f ( z l~) and f(zlx,) are independent of 8, but x, is, in a natural sense, much more informative than 5 about z. For one thing,
It is intuitively clear that once we know the value of x,, Z does not provide any additional information about z. In Section 5 we show that the general (partial) LP implies that all information about z is contained in f (zly) = f (zlx,), and that any method based on f (zlx,) satisfies LP. We shall say that X , is purely predictive sufficient. So in this example, it turns out that X , is sufficient for predicting z , whereas X is sufficient for 8.
In general, we introduce the following definition of pure prediction sufficiency.
Definition 2. T ( Y ) is purely predictive sufficient if f0 (zl y)
If T is purely predictive sufficient, then Y,Z are conditionally independent. When f (zly)is independent of 8, the likelihood factorizes as
In fact, l y ( z , 8) = 11(2)12(0)for some 1 1 , l~if and only if f ( z J y )is independent of 8, and then l l ( z ) cx f (zjy).So in this case we get a unique partial likelihood l l ( z )for z.
In general, LP applies to z and 0 . For the special case 'when (4) holds, in Section 5.2 we formulate a partial likelihood principle that applies to inference about z alone. For a purely predictive sufficient statistic, Theorem 1 can be strengthened with an optimality result.
Theorem 2. Consider univariate Z , with E e ( Z 2 ) < oo, and assume that T is purely predictive sufficient. Let g l ( t ) = E ( Z 1 t ) . Then, for all g ( Y ) with finite second moment, Remark. In Basu's example, gl = x,, and hence X, is the MSE-optimal predictor for Z .
ProoJ See the Appendix. Decision-theoretic aspects of prediction sufficiency have been studied by Takeuchi and Akahira (1975) and Torgersen (1977) . Other uses of prediction sufficiency have been advanced by Dawid (1979) , Takada (1981 Takada ( , 1982 , Skinner (1983) , and Johansson (1990) . Hill (1990) used the concept of adequacy to define sufficiency in empirical Bayes models.
General Sufficiency
Consider the general experiment E = { Y , ($, 0 ) , P ) with
y). Generalizing prediction sufficiency, define T = T ( Y )to be sufficient for ( A , 0 ) if T is sufficient in the family { f~( y I X ) ) e , x
Let Y be the sample space of Y. The sample space for Y in this conditional family is then Y A = { y E YIX($, y ) = X for some $1. To state SP, we need to take into account that X may depend on y, and consider only y l , y2 E Y A .
Then SP states that I A ( E , y l ) = I A ( E , y 2 ) , provided that T ( y l ) = T ( y 2 ) .
Note also that sufficiency is considered for ( A , 6 ) , not for ($,0 ) . Similar to Lemma 1, it is readily seen that we have the following result. Then 6 = ( p ,o, o,) , and the complete model is given by
Lemma 2. T is sufficient for
Next, we look at two distinct inferential problems. The first is estimation of 6. Here $ is essential for modeling purposes but is not of inferential interest; that is, X does not exist. T is sufficient if T is sufficient in the family { f 8 ( y ) ) . The second problem is estimation of the group means $; that is, A = $. In this case sufficiency is with respect to the family { f o e ( y 1 A ) ) ; that is, (TI,,. . . ,Yk,, SS,) is minimal sufficient for estimating the latent variables X (and 0 , of course).
In the discrete case, T is sufficient for ( A , 6 ) if f8(ylt, A) = f ( y l t ) for all y E Y x . In the continuous case, formally T is sufficient if and only if there exists a version of the conditional distribution of Y given t ,X that is independent of 6 , A. This is equivalent to the following: f 8 ( y l t , X ) is independent of 0 , X ; a.e. (with respect to Lebesgue measure). . .
It follows that any statistic equal to a sufficient statistic a.e. is also sufficient. As a consequence, as Joshi (1976) noted for the parametric case, we have that SP implies that I A ( E , y ) is the same for all y E Y x . This is seen as follows. Let y l , y2 be arbitrary points in Y x .Define T to be T ( y ) = y if y # y2, and T ( y 2 ) = yl. T is sufficient and hence, because T ( y l ) = T ( y z ) ,SP + I x ( E , y l )
is the same for all y E Y A .
From this it is clear that SP is meaningless in the continuous case if we allow any type of sufficient statistic. Thus we shall strengthen SP by requiring a stricter definition of sufficiency that more closely fits how we use sufficiency in statistical modeling and analysis.
We take the view that in statistical modeling, the point is to choose a realistic and operational unique model P = {f8 ( y , $), 6 E O ) that may allow for a reduction in the data by a (minimal) sufficient statistic T in the sense that fe(yIX) = h ( y ) g e , x ( T ( y ) ) ; that is, fe(ylt, A) is independent of 0 , A, for all y. For the statistical analysis, it is this regular sufficient T that is of interest. It is (statistically) irrelevant that any density equal to fs(ylX) a.e. can represent the same distribution and that any statistic equal to T a.e. is also mathematically sufficient. No such density or statistic would ever be used in any real statistical analysis. In fact, SP applied to any mathematical sufficient statistic clarifies this point and does not reflect negatively on SP, which is perfectly valid. It is the role of mathematical sufficiency in how it relates to the theory and practice of statistics that is questionable. Sometimes a pure mathematical or probabilistic approach to the theory of statistics can conceal important statistical considerations. Birnbaum (1972) seemed to take a similar viewpoint. But choosing a unique density can also be considered mathematically. Evans et al. (1985) imposed topological regularity conditions on the sample space and defined a unique canonical density through a certain limiting process. Typically, when fe ( y ,$) is continuous, it is also the canonical density. Even though this is an interesting mathematical consideration, it seems unnecessary. From a statistical modeling viewpoint, P = { f~( y ,
To illustrate how meaningless mathematical or probabilistic sufficiency can be in practice, consider the example given by Birnbaum (1972) of an iid sample from a N ( 0 , l ) population. Then a is regular sufficient, whereas t* = { a if 5 is not rational, 0 if 5 is rational is mathematically sufficient. Because any computed observed a is rational, using t* as the sufficient statistic, we would estimate 0 by zero "mathematically," no matter what the data are.
These considerations lead to the following, assuming that
Of course, in discrete cases regular sufficiency is the same as mathematical sufficiency. We now have the following formal SP for both continuous and discrete experiments:
Outside of missing-data problems, typically X = A($), independent of y. Then (a) is superfluous, and SP reduces to the obvious modification of SPP from Section 3.1.
Consider empirical Bayes models, P = {f e ( y , $),0 E O ) , where f e ( y , $) = fs($) f ( yI$). The quantity of interest is X = A($). From Lemma 2, T is sufficient iff (a) T is sufficient for 0 in the marginal distribution of Y , and (b) the posterior of X depends on y only through T ( y ) .We see, as Hill (1990) noted, that sufficiency in this model requires both frequentist sufficiency for 0 and Bayesian sufficiency for A. In empirical Bayes models, sufficiency in { f~( y l X ) )~ implies parametric sufficiency. Often, it is much easier to study sufficiency in {fe(yIX))x than in {f @ (~) )So even when parametric sufficiency is of interest, it may be convenient to study general sufficiency in the latent empirical Bayes model. The next example illustrates this. ( y ) .But the point is that we do not need to know the distribution of Y to find the sufficient statistics.
In the literature, general (mathematical) sufficiency of the kind considered here has been studied by Skibinsky (1967) and Hill (1990) . Hill (1990) considered essentially empirical Bayes models, which formally are very similar to the general model (2), and defined sufficiency in the same way but did not consider regular sufficiency. From now on we simplify our terminology, and whenever the term "sufficiency" is used it means "regular sufficiency."
In addition to prediction (Sec. 3.1) and empirical Bayes models, other special cases are:
Parametric model and parametric inference. P = { f e ( y ) , 0 E O ) .
Here $ and X do not exist and Definition 3 becomes: fe(ylt) = f ( yIt);that is, usual parametric sufficiency. ( X l t ) ; that is, the posterior of X depends only on t , the usual definition of Bayes sufficiency.
The Conditionality Principle
Let us first review CP for frequentistic, parametric inference. Let E = { Y ,0 , P ) with P = { f e ( y ) , 0 E @ ) . Birnbaum (1962) formulated the following CP: (Ce): Let E* be a mixture of experiments with components { E j ) (with common unknown O), where Ej is selected by a known random mechanism; that is, E* consists of first selecting a component experiment Ej and then observing the outcome y j of Ej such that the outcome of E can be represented as ( j ,y j ) . Then I ( E * , ( j ,y j ) ) = I ( E j ,y j ) .
( C B )asserts that experiments not actually performed are irrelevant, and originated from a discussion by Cox (1958) , who provided the crucial idea of a mixture experiment. Basu (1975) recognized that Birnbaum's main result (1) only requires the following weaker version of (CB):
(WCB):Let E* be a mixture of two experiments, El and E2,with known mixture probabilities 1/2 for each experiment. Then I ( E * ,( j ,y j ) ) = I ( E j ,y j ) .
For the general statistical problem, we will need only the analog of ( W C B ) .Again, to simplify terminology, the term weak is not used here. Hence we have the following: CP: Consider two experiments with identical ($,0 ) and the same X function; A($, .):
. Let E* be the mixture experiment that chooses El or E2with probability 1/2 each;
Here f; ( j ,yj, $) = f e (yj,$). Let A, = A($, yj); then Ix,(E*,(j,yj))= I~* ( E j ,~j y j ) .
Remark CP with two about the same unknown physical quantities 6 , $. As an illustration, consider two sampling designs for the same finite population. Then CP says that the inference for the unobserved part of the population depends only on the chosen design. From the frequentistic viewpoint, all statistical inference is evaluated through evaluation of the methods used in the analysis, and a definition of likelihood is not necessary for this. In the usual Neyman-Pearson-Wald (NPW) approach, one is really not concerned about how the method fares for the actual data that we obtain, although an NPW frequentist likes to think that the criteria for evaluating methods, such as a confidence level, also are relevant criteria for the analysis that we do for the actual data. One important aspect of statistical science that LP clarifies is the fallacy of this belief. As noted by BW, LP says that procedure performance should not be used as the evidence about (A, Q) on observing a particular y. Having identified the likelihood function, we see which methods violate LP. Principles and criteria for procedure performance cannot be a suficient guide for statistical analysis of data. But evaluation of methods may still be relevant, after making sure that LP is satisfied, especially if a method is to be used repeatedly. So in a sense, frequentistic evaluation is a secondary consideration according to LP.
To define the likelihood in our general problem, the guide is CP and SP in the sense that we shall require the likelihood to be such that the corresponding LP is implied by CP and SP. In Section 4.2 we show that the likelihood then must be given by (31, 1,(A, Q) = fe(y, A).
An important discussion of general likelihood took place at the Fourth Purdue Symposium on Statistical Decision Theory and Related Topics. There Butler (1987) , in the discussion of work of Bayarri et al. (1987) , recognized that we are led to a unique likelihood specification once a model and inferential aim are specified. Butler mainly considered prediction and proposed (3) as a general definition of likelihood. Also, BW seems to agree with this choice, arguing that the likelihood should be a function of all unknown variables and parameters that are relevant to the statistical problem. Bayarri et al. (1987) argued that no general definition can be given. They considered the two possibilities: lob, = f (observedlunobserved) = f~(yl$) and lrv = f (random variableslfixed parameters) = fe (Y, $1. Bayarri et al. (1987) showed, by several examples, that neither of these approaches is suitable as a general definition, and they concluded that no general definition can be found. We note that neither of these suggestions corresponds in general to 1(A, 0) = fs (y,A). The essential feature of this definition, as noted earlier, is that it depends on the following two factors: a. specification of the complete model for observable variables, unobserved variables of interest (both in a modeling sense and for inferential interest) and unknown parameters b. inferential aim of the statistical investigation. Bayarri et al. (1987) did not involve factor b in the definitions and seemed to overlook the major role that the inferential aim plays in determining the quantities, (A, Q), that should enter into the likelihood. Hence 1(A, Q) was not considered as a possible definition. As shown by Butler (1987) , 1(A, Q) resolves all the issues regarding a rigorous definition of likelihood raised by Bayarri et al. (1987) . One of these issues, and maybe the most important one, that makes both lobs and lrV unsuitable as general definitions, is what to do with unobserved variables that may be present, and the fact that there is always a wide variety of such variables that can be introduced. Then both lobs and l,, depend on the unobserved variables that a 6 introduced, and by either choice the likelihood is not uniquely defined. This issue is then resolved by the factor b. It i s the objective of the investigation that decides which unobserved variables should be included in the likelihood. For example, suppose that we have a parametric problem and are interested only in 0. Let II, denote all conceivable unobservable variables. Because no part of $ is of interest, $ should be integrated out from fs (y,$), giving us the likelihood 1(Q) = fs (y). Bayarri et al. (1987) showed, by considering prediction in exponential distributions, that maximum likelihood (ML) estimation may not work in general, when both unobserved variables and fixed parameters are of interest. This illustrates that one must be careful with conventional likelihood methods for parametric inference when the likelihood includes random variables, as in the case of prediction. But this is not a criticism of the likelihood definition or LP and should not keep us from recognizing the fact that 1, (A, 0) = fe (y ,A) does contain all information about (A, Q) and should form the basis for our statistical analysis. As noted by Berliner (1987) , LP does not provide any suggestions for a particular method; it says what one should not do. But because of the role played by ML estimation in parametric inference and its general intuitive appeal, it is clearly necessary to study under what conditions this method will work in general with likelihood (3). The behavior of the partial log-likelihood derivatives will probably play a central role. Kaminsky and Rhodin (1985) applied the method 798 of ML, based on (3), for prediction of higher-order statistics -from lower-order ones. BW (sec. 3.3, after discussing various alternatives, ends up agreeing with Butler (1987) , proposing (3) as the "practical" definition of likelihood.
Once it has been recognized that the inferential aim of the investigation is essential in defining the likelihood, an alternative to (3) is to use lobs for A; that is, Although Bayarri et al. (1987) concluded that no general definition can be given, Bayarri and DeGroot (1988) , in a discussion in BW, recommended (7). Royal1 (1976) proposed (7) in survey sampling, under a population model. Theoretically, (7) is the obvious modification of parametric likelihood by "making" X a parameter and hence conditioning on all unknown quantities of interest. Note also that we define T to be sufficient if T is sufficient in the family {fe ( y IX)). But intuitively, this definition of a likelihood seems inappropriate for the simple reason that if Y and X are stochastically independent, then (7) does not depend on X and hence contains no information about A. BW makes the same argument. When X and Y are independent, with l* we lose the information that Y carries about X through 0 . We also note that in the Bayes parametric model, l* is the parametric likelihood, overlooking the prior information, whereas 1, ( A , 0 ) = f e ( y , A) is equivalent to the posterior density.
The Likelihood Principle
Let us first review the likelihood principle ( L B ) , for parametric inference given by Birnbaum (1962) . Here E = { Y , 0 , P ) with P = {fe ( y ) , 0 E 01,and the likelihood is
y ) . ( L B ) . Let El and E2 be two experiments (with common parameter 0 ) . Assume that y l , y2 are outcomes of E l ,E2 with proportional likelihood functions; that is, l i t ) ( 0 )
= c l g ) ( 0 ) for all 0 in 0 , for some constant (in 0 ) c > 0.
Then I ( & , Y I ) = I ( & , Y Z ) .
Consider now experiments and inferential problems of the general kind, with E = { Y , ($, O), P ) , where
A). The following general LP has not to my knowledge been formulated precisely before.
General likelihood principle. Consider two experiments with identical ($,0 ) :
and Journal of the American Statistical Association, June 1996 Assume that
(a) A($, y l ) = A($, Y Z ) , V i that is, A,, = A,, = X (8) and (b) l i t ) ( A , 0 ) = c l g ) ( A , 0 ) ; c independent of ( A , 0 ) .

Then I x ( E 1 , Y I ) = I x ( E 2 , Y Z )
Remarks.
1. Using frequentist considerations (over the distribution of Y ) alone to evaluate the evidence in the data will violate LP. LP is concerned with evaluation of information in the actual data, whereas frequentist evaluation is concerned with method performance in hypothetical repetitions of the experiment. That does not mean that evaluation of methods may not be relevant, especially if a method is to be used repeatedly. Indeed, as shown by BW (sec. 3.7), acting in violation of LP may result in inferior methods by frequentist criteria.
2. Let g ( X ) be any function of A. Then_ LP has the invariance property: Assume that (a) and (b) hold.
LP Then l$:)(g(X), 0 ) = c l g ) ( g ( X ) , 0 ) =+ I y j x :( E l ,Y l ) =
I y ( x ) ( E 2 , ~2 ) .
3. When X depends on the data, we obviously need to require (8) to compare likelihood functions of identical unknown quantities. When X = A($) is independent of y , (8) is superfluous, and LP is the obvious modification of (LB).
4. Hill (1987a,b) claimed that the likelihood principle is questionable and tried to illustrate this with an example of an inference problem with a random parameter. But Hill did not include this parameter in the likelihood, using the traditional parametric likelihood. As emphasized by Butler (1987) , one cannot separate the inferential aim from the definition of the likelihood. The likelihood function (3) and the accompanying general LP resolve the ambiguity that results when using the inappropriate parametric likelihood for problems involving random quantities. It follows that LP, with the proper likelihood, is valid also in Hill's example.
5. When applying LP, one should reduce the likelihood function maximally by separating out ancillary information that can be used for model evaluation. Consider the case where the minimal sufficient T = ( 6 , a ) for some estimate
6, and assume that f s ( a ) = f ( a ) , independent of 0 . Then the likelihood becomes 1, ( A , 0 ) = fe (6, Xla) f ( a ) f ( y It).Because l,(X, 0 ) is proportional to f s ( 8 , Ala), LP says that all information about ( A , 0 ) is contained in fs ( 6 , A la).
Hill (1990) gave four other reasons for using f e ( 6 , Xla) for inference purposes: (a) it accounts for the inherent variability of A by averaging over A; (b) it accounts for the variability due to estimation of 0 by 6 by averaging over 6; (c) it accounts for model checking by conditioning on a ; and (d) it captures all of the information in the minimal sufficient t = ( 0 , a ) .
Hence we see that LP with 1, as likelihood will automatically make sure that all of these aspects are taken care of in our inference.
LP in Survey Sampling. In survey sampling, under a population model, X depends on the data, and (8) sumptions are made about the sampling plan f s ( s1 y, ,y,) .
Typically, of course, it is independent of 0 as well as (y,, y u ) Little (1982) 
and (9) * sl = s2 = S , provided that all yi can take at least two values. It follows that we are only interested in comparing likelihoods when the samples are identical.
Assume that the sampling plans, f ( l )( s l )and f ( 2 )( s 2 ) , are independent of 6 and ( y , , y u ) .Then I (~) ( Y ? ) , O )f e ( y S I , ( j ) ( j ) ( s j ) ,
To apply LP, (9) In general, we note that the sampling plan fe (sly,, y,) is irrelevant for inference, according to LP, if and only if fe (sly,, yu) is independent of (6, y,). For example, we can ignore the sampling plan at the inference stage even if it depends on y,, like in sequential plans. 
. , m , and $i -N (~, o~) , E~~
The complete model is given by (5). We consider two inferential problems: (a) estimation of 6, the usual ANOVA problem; and (b) estimation of X = $. In case (a) the likelihood is given by 1, .
a , 2 ) , and
For all three problems, Y is sufficient.
To prove the main result we need the following lemma. 
( l )( A ,6) = C Z (~) c independent of ( A ,6). ( A ,6 ) ;
We must show that I x ( E l , y?) = I x ( E 2 , y; ). Construct the mixture experiment E* by choosing El or E z , each with probability 1/2. From CP, it is enough to show that We now apply SP to prove (13). In general, the joint distribution of Y* = (J,Y J )and A is given by f; ( ( j , y j ) 
+). Now f e ( y l t , A) = f e ( y , A)/ f e ( t , A ) It follows that for j = 1, 2, f e (~j , A) = f e ( y j l T (~j ) , A ) f~( T ( y j ) , A) = h j ( y j ) f~( t , A) =+ fe(y1, A) = { h l (~l ) l h z ( Y z ) } f s ( Y 2Ã).
(b) LP + CP: Let E* be the mixture of El and E2 with observations yl and y2, and define Aj = A($, y j ) . The likelihood in E* with observation ( j , y j ) is given by It,,i, ( A j , 1 ( j ) Q) = f ; ( ( j ? ~j ) ,
e ( y j , A j ) = ; I g ) ( A j , Q ) . LP now applies: Ix, ( E * ,( j , y j ) ) = IA, ( E j , y j ) .
1. BW (sec. 3.5.3) conjectured, unbeknown to the author at the time that this work was done, that a version of LP for prediction, based on (3), probably follows from versions of CP and SP. Theorem 3 verifies that this conjecture is indeed correct.
2. We see that in the proof of (+), we must define the likelihood function such that proportionality of likelihoods implies (14), which is equivalent to An alternative definition of likelihood is the direct modification (7), fe ( y 1A), of parametric likelihood. Assum-
Hence with fs(yIA) as likelihood, we are not able to show that SP & CP + LP, even though sufficiency is defined relative to the family { f e ( y l A ) } . 3. In the Bayes model, LP is identical to the Bayes principle and says that if the posterior distributions of A are the same for yl and y2, then we should perform the same inference. Theorem 3 says that CP and the Bayes sufficiency principle together are equivalent to the Bayes principle.
LP implies that I x ( E , y ) depends on E and y only through the function I,(A, 0 ) . To see this, it is enough to observe that if ( E l ,y l ) has lh:)(A, Q ) = I,(A, Q ) , then I x ( E 1 ,~1 )
= I x ( E , y ) . 5. After Birnbaum (1962) proved Theorem 3 for parametric inference, it was clear that statisticians using samJournal of the American Statistical Association, June 1996 pling theory-based inference must reject or at least modify CP or SP. Cox and Hinkley (1974) , Durbin (1970) , , Holm (1985) , and Kalbfleisch (1975) have proposed various such modifications. Durbin suggested that the ancillary statistic must be a part of the minimal sufficient statistic. The proof of Birnbaum's result fails when the domain of CP is restricted in this way. Arguments against Durbin's suggestion have been made by Birnbaum (1970) , BW, and Savage (1970) . As observed by BW (sec. 3.6.3), Durbin's restriction has the implication that whether we shall condition on the performed experiment depends on the incidental structure of an unperformed experiment. argued against the joint application of SP and CP. Cox and Hinkley (1974, p. 41) and Kalbfleisch (1975) argued essentially that SP is not applicable to mixture experiments. Then LP does not follow from SP and CP. BW (sec. 3.6.4) made the following points against such a restriction of sufficiency: (a) It seems artificial to restrict principles of inference to certain types of experiments; (b) it is difficult to distinguish between mixture and nonmixture experiments; (c) mixture experiments can often be-shown to be equivalent to nonmixture experiments (Birnbaum 1975 and MacLaren 1975 illustrated (b) and (c)); (d) in almost any situation, behavior in violation of sufficiency can be shown to be inferior. Holm (1985) suggested other reformulations of SP and CP such that Theorem 3 does not hold.
6. For parametric inference, various alternative principles to SP and CP also imply LP (Berger 1984; Birnbaum 1972; Dawid 1977) . For the discrete case, claimed that a generalized version of CP, say CP*, alone implies LP. Their argument applies also to the continuous case, provided thakthe density of the data is bounded as a function of the parameters. As pointed out by Dawid (1986) in the discussion, what they actually showed was that CP* together with the distribution principle (defined in Dawid 1977) implies LP.
LIKELIHOOD WITH NUISANCE PARAMETERS
Partial Likelihood
We now consider the case of nuisance parameters in Q. Nuisance variables in $ are of course handled by integrating out to obtain f e ( y ; A).'In this section we use the notation ( 8 , w ) , where Q is of interest and w are the nuisance parameters. Included in the general setup are the cases where (a) Q does not exist (i.e., all parameters are considered as nuisance parameters), and (b) A does not exist (i.e., +, if it exists, is integrated out). For parametric inference, case (b), there is a vast literature on various suggestions for partial likelihood for Q. We refer to BW for references. The goal in this section is to generalize the principles of sufficiency and likelihood to cover inferential problems for ( A , 8 ) only. The general LP and SP, in Section 4, do not say how to exclude the nuisance parameters. The only situation in which it seems possible to have valid principles of likelihood and sufficiency for ( A , Q ) alone is when the likelihood factorizes, for some 11, 12. Here 1(A, 0 , w ) = fe,,(y, A) . It is assumed that 6' and w are independent parameters, in the sense that w carries no information about 0. One way to express this is that if we were to observe w in addition to y , then our inference about Q would not change provided (15) holds. BW (Section 3.5) formalizes this concept of parameter independence. Note that (15) implies that ( A , 0 ) and w are conditionally independent given y for all hyperpriors on ( 0 , w ) of the form f ( 0 , w ) = f ( Q ) f ( w ) .
Granted, situations where (15) holds do not occur often. But in major fields of statistics like survey sampling with nonresponse and, in general, missing-data problems, the typical model assumptions are of the form (15). Section 6 considers such models in survey sampling. Hinde and Aitkin (1987) attempted to find approximate factorizations of the form (15). In Bayes and empirical Bayes (EB) models, (15) is not of interest. In Bayes models, ( 8 , w ) is known, and EB models are typically of the form 
and Assume that (15) holds for both experiments; that is, lh;) (A, 8, w ) = (') (A, Q)12 ( 1 ) ( w ) and l,, ( 2 ) (A, Q, w ) ( 2 ) (A, Q) Y,A are conditionally independent given t . A partial sufficient T is not sufficient for inference about (A,Q ) in general, because for a given w inference based on 801 T may depend also on the chosen w. Estimating 6' from a N ( 0 , w ) sample is an example of this. But when the likelihood factorizes, the factor l1 will depend on y only through T ( y ) , and we formulate the following partial sufficiency principle (PSP):
PSP: Assume that (15) If Ix,e(E,, y l ) = Ix, e(Ew, ~2 ) for all w , then I x , e ( E , y i ) = I x , e ( E , Y Z ) .
given arbitrary w , and T ( y 1 ) = T ( y 2 ) , then from SP, Ix,e(E,, y i ) = Ix,e(E,, yz) . Because w is arbitrary this holds for all w and from UP Ix,e ( E , y l ) = Ix, e ( E , y2) .
Consider parametric inference for Q in the model P = {fe,,(y)} with property (15) Note that using the expected Fisher information instead of i(6)violates PLP, adding support to the arguments of Efron and Hinkley (1978) . Reversing the roles of Q and w , we see that S is partial sufficient for w with MLE ij = s and observed Fisher information is equal to s/G2 = l / s , independent of Q.
If ( 
Prediction
Let us now consider prediction problems of the type described in Section 3.1. Y, Z -f,(y, z), w E fl, and the problem is to predict z with w considered as nuisance parameters. we follow the notation of section 5.1 regarding the fixed parameters. N~~, = + = z. ~h~ likelihood function is l(z,w) = f,(y, z), and 0 in the role of Section 5.1 does not exist. Hence prediction of z is the only inferential goal. Factorization now means that for some 11, 12, We have that (17) is equivalent with f (zly) being independent of w and ll (z) cc f (zly). One such case is example 1 (by Basu) from Section 3.1. From PLP, we have the following partial LP for prediction (PLPP), for factorized experiments:
PLPP: Consider with identical (z, w): Ej = {Yj, (z, w), Pj);Pj = {fL!)(yj,z),w E fl);lg)(z,w) = fL!)(yj,z),j = 1,2. Assume (17) for El and E2 with I?)(,) as the z factor for Ej and 1,
(1) (z) = cl?) (2); c independent of z.
( 1 8) Then Iz(El,yl) = Iz(E2,yz). Note that (18) is equivalent to f(')(zlyl) = f(')(zlyz), for all z. Hence PLPP says that all information about z is contained in f (z1 y) if (17) holds.
To see how PSP can be formulated for prediction problems, we first relate the concepts of pure prediction sufficiency (from Definition 2 in Sec. 3.1) and partial sufficiency. Recall that T is purely predictive sufficient if and only if f, (zly) = f (zit), independent of w. Noting that f,(ylt, z) = f,(~lt)f,(zl~)lf,(zlt), we have:
T is purely predictive sufficient * (17) holds and T is partial sufficient for z.
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It follows that the partial sufficiency principle for prediction (PSPP) is as follows.
PSPP: Let T be purely predictive sufficient and let T(yl) = T(y2). Then I z (El yl) = 1, (E,92) . From Theorem 4, we then have the equivalence, CP & PSPP * PLPP.
Example 1 (Basu) (cont.) . Y consists of iid N(w, 1) XI, . . . ,X,. Z = X, + U, where Y, U are independent and U is N ( 0 , l ) . We found in Section 3.1 that (x,X,) is predictive sufficient, whereas X, is purely predictive sufficient. The likelihood function is l(z, w) = f,(y, z) = f ( 2 1~~) = ll (q)12(w), and (17) holds. Here ll (z) f,(y) = f (zIx,) N(x,, I ) , and X, is partial sufficient for z.
N
From PLPP, it follows that all information about z is contained in f (zlx,), and the prediction issues in this example raised by Basu (1974) are resolved: X, is sufficient for prediction, and any prediction method satisfying the partial LP must depend on f (z lx,) only. So even if f (21%) is independent of 0, using f (21%) violates PLPP. In addition, from Theorem 2, X, is also the MSE-optimal predict~r for Z.
Predictive Likelihood
With I,(%, w) = f, (y, z) as the joint likelihood for (z, w), one way to construct likelihood prediction methods is to base the prediction analysis on a predictive likelihood (PL) L(zIY) which is obtained by eliminating w from l,(z,w). Bjflnstad (l990) reviewed some of the suggestions for L given in the literature. Typically, L is obtained by integration, maximization, or conditioning operations. If (17) .holds, then there exists a unique likelihood for z, ll (z) = f (zl y), and "a PL, L should therefore be proportional (in z) to f (zl y). Otherwise, L will not contain all information about z that-is contained in the data y. In general, a natural requirement for calling L a likelihood is that it satisfies LP. This means that if the joint likelihoods from two experiments are proportional, then L should lead to identical prediction analyses. For this to be possible for any PL, we necessarily must consider proportional (in z) predictive likelihoods as equivalent. Still, not all PL proposed in the literature are proper likelihoods in this sense. Formally, we propose the following definition.
De$nition 5. Consider two experiments with identical unknown quantities (z, w): Ej = {Yj, (z, w), P,), Pj = {f, (j) (yj,z),w E 52): andlg)(z,w)= fL!)(%,z),j = 1,2. A predictive likelihood L(zly) is said to be a proper predictive likelihood if, for some c, k independent of (z, w), Here L(') and L(') are L applied in experiments El and E2.
As argued by Bjerrnstad (1990) , normalizing L to be a probability distribution in z makes it better suited for prediction analysis, playing a role similar to the posterior predictive density in a Bayesian analysis. Let L denote the normalized version of L. If (17) holds, then we should have 0 L (zl y) = f (zl y). If (17) does not hold and L is a proper predictive likelihood, then inference based on L satisfies LP, because (19) implies that the normalized versions are identical.
We next look at some of the predictive likelihoods considered in the review by Bjmrnstad (1990) . To do so, we need to introduce some terminology. i j is the MLE of w based on the data y, and 3, is the MLE based on ( y , z ) . Let I" (w) be the observed information-matrix based on ( y , z ) ; that'is, IZ(w)= {I;j ( w ) ) with Ifj (w) = -d210g f, (y, z)/dw,dw,) .
The naive approach is to simply replace w with i j , giving us the estimative likelihood, L,(zly) = 1,(2,3) with ~, ( z l y ) = f;(zly). It is well known that L, is not a useful prediction tool, because it will underestimate the inherent uncertainty in the prediction problem by assuming that w = i j . Harris (1989) suggested one way to adjust for this by integrating L, with respect to the distribution of 3,computed at w = 2. Harris called this the bootstrap predictive distribution. In the continuous case, it can be expressed as
L*(zly)= J f t ( z l y ) f ; ( i j= t )dt.
Several of the proposed PL's are modifications of the profile PL, given by L,(zly) = sup,l,(z,w) = l, (z,ij,) . If w has high dimension, then L, can be misleadingly precise. Thus various adjustments of L, have been proposed, including
and L, was first studied by Mathiasen (1979) ; Davison (1986) suggested L f ) , and Butler (1989) suggested L?), and BarndorE-Nielsen (1980) 
presented L f ) .
Consider continuous ( Y ,2) .Let k , n , and m be the dimensions of w, y, and z. Define H, = H, (ij,) , where H , (w) is the k x ( n + m ) matrix of second-order partial derivatives of log f,(y, z ) with respect to w and ( y , z ) ; that is, the ith row is given by d210g f, (y, z)/dwid(y, z ) . A fourth modification of L,, suggested by Butler (1986, rejoinder) , to Butler (1986 Butler ( , 1989 and Bjmrnstad (1990) . Here we are interested in finding out which of these are proper PL's. Prooj See the Appendix. Remark. Two of the earliest attempts at predictive likelihoods, by Hinkley (1979) and Lauritzen (1974) , are of the conditional type LC.But, as is seen by Theorem 5b, these prediction functions are not likelihood functions in the proper sense.
A predictor for z can be obtained, for a given normalized L, in essentially two ways: maximum likelihood (ML) predictor, by maximizing L ( z1 y), and mean likelihood pre-0 dictor: E,(Z) = mean of L (zl y). The ML predictor shares the same kind of problem as the general ML method (see Sec. 4.1), as mentioned by Bj~rnstad (1990) .
An important type of prediction inference is to give an interval estimate that is expected to contain z with a high degree, 1 -a , of confidence. Having chosen a predictive likelihood L, one natural interval method is to construct the shortest possible (1 -a ) predictive interval based on L, as suggested by Bjmrnstad (1990) . This is given by (assuming that L is unimodal) where k,, in the continuous case is determined such that It is clear that if L is a proper likelihood, then the predictive interval given by (20) and (21) satisfies LP. Evaluation of prediction intervals is itself a major issue that is not completely resolved (see, e.g., the discussion in Bjmrnstad 1990). Even if the interval is based on a proper predictive likelihood, the unconditional coverage, C ( w )= P,(Z E I y ) , is not a relevant measure,, according to LP, for evaluating the actual computed interval for the observed data. C ( w )is of course still a valid criterion for the method given by (20) and (21).
For the actual computed interval I,, a data-dependent criis given by L f ) ( z y )= L , (~J~) I~(~, )~~~/ J H , H~~~~.
Let r ( Y , Z ) be a minimal sufficient statistic of w based on (Y,2). By conditioning on r, we eliminate w and obtain a conditional PL: Lc(zly) = f, (y, z ) / f W ( r ( y , z ) ) . In the continuous case, LC depends on which version of r that is chosen. Butler (1986) showed that the modification LI(zjy) = is invariant with respect to ~, ( z j y ) l J J~~-~/~ choice of r. Here J is the p x ( n + m ) matrix of partial derivatives of r = ( r l , .. . ,r,) with respect to ( y , z ) ; that is, the ith row is equal to dri/d (y, z ) . LC, suggested by Butler (1986) for the discrete case, is similar to the conditional PL's studied by Hinkley (1979) and Lauritzen (1974) . For a detailed comparison of these and some others, we refer terion is the conditional coverage, C(wly)= PW (ZE 1, ly) . Assume that L is proper and consider two experiments with proportional likelihoods, li:) ( z , w) = clg) ( z , w ) . Then f, ( 2 ) (zIy2) = f ? ) ( z~y l )and I,, = I,,. It follows that ( y l )= d 2 ) ( w (yz) , and the coverage function C(.ly) satisfies LP. Other types of coverage involve integrating over y values and will violate LP. We can conclude that a predictive interval based on a proper predictive likelihood with C(.ly)as a measure of confidence constitutes an analysis that satisfies LP. Moreover, from a likelihood perspective, the basic feature of a prediction interval (by any method) is the conditional coverage function C(.l y) .
ference. From LP, I, (& 0) contains all relevant information about (A, 0) and should be the basis for the statistical analysis. One general consequence is that the usual frequentistic criteria for evaluating statistical methods are not valid criteria for statistical analysis of actual data. For example, a prediction analysis that satisfies LP can be based on a proper PL with the predictive interval evaluated by the conditional coverage function. The usual unconditional confidence level should be used to evaluate only the method, not the computed interval. 
APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 4
Consider for given w the following partition of the sample space:
The different D" ( y o ) are disjoint and constitute a true partition. Exactly as in proof of Lemma 3, this partition is (regular) minimal sufficient for ( A , 8 ) , given w . Now, because of (15) 
Proof of Theorem 5
Parts (a) and (c) are straightforward, while LCand LI cannot satisfy (19) since they depend on the distribution of sufficient statistics. L?) does not satisfy (19) since the Hzcan differ in E l and E 2 , because of differentiating with respect to y. L* depends on the distribution of 3, and therefore cannot satisfy (19) . [Received October 1992 . Revised May 1995 
